A Conceptual Investigation of Justice by Kyle Johannsen

Author:Kyle Johannsen [Johannsen, Kyle]
Language: eng
Format: epub, pdf
Tags: Social Science, Political Science, General, Political Ideologies
ISBN: 9781351736336
Google: uuI2DwAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 36761377
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2017-09-22T00:00:00+00:00

4. Clarity and Fairness

Thus far, we’ve discussed two reasons for why the clarity of a regulatory principle matters. One reason is that the function of a regulatory principle is to guide action, and a lack of clarity undermines this. Another reason is that a lack of clarity compromises publicity. A further reason not yet discussed is that attempting to follow an unclear principle has distributive consequences. Some people will inadvertently do more than is required of them, and some will inadvertently do less; this in turn leads to unfairness. A good way to understand the unfairness I have in mind is with reference to Cohen’s (and my) favorite conception of distributive fairness: luck egalitarianism. When the luck egalitarian standard is used to evaluate the effects of applying the difference principle to personal choice, it is clear that there is an important sense in which the difference principle falls short of it. Since committed citizens are unable to determine when they have done enough to fulfill the requirements of a welfare-inclusive, prerogative-constrained difference principle, the regulatory application of said principle to personal choice runs contrary to luck equality in an important way. Its lack of clarity inevitably yields unchosen inequality in the distribution of burden, as some people will inadvertently take on a greater burden than is required of them by the difference principle, while others will inadvertently take on a lesser burden than is required of them. Of course, the difference principle, as a regulatory principle, always falls short of perfect fairness. This is because taking all things into consideration means deviating from the requirements of fairness for the sake feasibility and competing values. The unfairness I have identified is different, however. It does not lie in the fact that the difference principle is insensitive to differences between members of the worst-off group or in the fact that it allows for necessary inequalities between differently talented citizens, but rather in the effect its unclear application to personal choice has on the distribution of burden. An ethos based on the difference principle thus deviates from luck equality in a way that is independent from the familiar, content-specific deviations.

It might be objected that ethotic commitment to the Difference Principle is always a matter of choice, just as any unenforced moral requirement is. If so, then how are inequalities in the level of ethotic contribution to the worst-off unfair? Citizens choose whether to commit themselves to the difference principle, and thus any accidental inequality in the associated distribution of burden is produced by option luck.48

Though it is true that citizens choose whether or not to apply the difference principle in their personal lives, I do not think it is appropriate to treat inequalities indirectly associated with the choice to commit one’s self to the difference principle as standard cases of option luck inequality. In standard cases of option luck, the choices made are not supposed to be morally obligatory. Whether the poker player decides to bet her money or merely play for fun is her prerogative.

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